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EVIDENCE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND CHILD MOLESTATION
CASES
INTRODUCTION
This survey examines the evidentiary issues raised in several cases
decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the 1996-97 survey
period.1 It specifically focuses on the court's interpretation and applica-
tion of Federal Rules of Evidence 403, 404(b) and 414. Part I summa-
rizes the recent history of Rules 403 and 404(b), including the applica-
tion of these rules during the survey period. Part II examines Rule 414
and the other Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to the admission of
evidence of similar crimes in sexual assault and child molestation cases.
This part also discusses the controversy surrounding these rules and ex-
plores how the court dealt with the application of Rules 403, 404(b) and
414 in its recent decision, United States v. Meacham!
I. PRIOR BAD AcTs AND STIPULATIONS TO FELON STATUS:
RULES 403 AND 404(B)
A. Background
1. Rule 404(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 404V prevents a litigant from introducing
testimony about a specific act in order to establish an individual's char-
acter and then argue that the individual acted in a manner consistent with
such character.! The rule is designed to prevent a jury from convicting an
individual either because he is "bad" and deserves punishment, or from
1. The survey period extended from September 1, 1996 through August 31, 1997. The evi-
dentiary cases heard by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals include: United States v. Wilson, 107
F.3d 774 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Shunway, 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir.
1997).
2. See FED. R. EviD. 413-415.
3. 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997).
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) is titled, "Character Evidence Generally." It states, in
relevant part: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the pur-
pose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.... FED. R. EViD. 404(a).
5. Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed Legisla-
tion: Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions, 44 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1125 (1993); see also Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to Arraign
His Whole Life?": How Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1996) (discussing the historical rejection of character evidence); Russell J. Davis,
Annotation, Admissibility, Under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of Evidence of Other
Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Not Similar to Offense Charged, 41 A.L.R. FED. 497, § 2[a] (1979) ("Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence... is a codification of the traditional common law position
that a person is to be tried only for the crime of which he is accused, not on the basis of 'bad char-
acter. ").
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placing too much weight on "other crimes" evidence and assuming that if
the individual committed a crime once, he must have committed the pre-
sent crime.' The prohibition on the use of character evidence is one of the
oldest fixtures in American evidence law.7 The drafters of Rule 404
clearly embraced this prohibition by including language barring the ad-
missibility of character evidence both in section (a) and (b).' Under Rule
404(b), however, evidence of other specific acts is not admissible to
show character in order to prove conduct, but it is admissible to show
other facts that may be at issue.9
The Tenth Circuit established an inclusive framework for the as-
sessment of Rule 404(b) admissions in United States v. Nolan.'" In Nolan,
the court described the parameters of Rule 404(b), holding that it would
"allow the admission of uncharged illegal acts unless the only purpose
for their admission is to prove the criminal disposition of the
defendant."'1 The court set forth five guidelines to analyze the admissi-
bility of uncharged illegal acts: (1) the evidence must tend to establish
one of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts as set forth by Rule 404(b);' (2)
the evidence must be so related to the importation of contraband that it
serves to establish one of the other crimes, wrongs, or acts set forth in
Rule 404(b);'3 (3) the evidence must have real probative value, not just
possible worth;'4 (4) the uncharged illegal act must be close in time to the
crime charged;" and (5) the probative value of proving the commission
of the prior crime must outweigh the potential for unfair prejudice."'
In subsequent cases, the court articulated additional guidelines con-
cerning Rule 404(b) admissions. 7 This eventual, rather lengthy list of
6. Davis, supra note 5.
7. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the American Character
Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment Off on the Right Foot, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285 (1995).
8. See FED. R. EviD. 404(a), 404(b).
9. 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404.20[l] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997); see also
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) entitled, "Other crimes, wrongs, or acts." It states, in relevant part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
10. 551 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1977).
11. Nolan, 551 F.2dat271.
12. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
13. Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271; see also FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
14. Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also FED. R. EvID. 403.
17. See United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
government bears the burden of showing the relevancy of the evidence and precisely articulating the
hypothesis by which a fact of consequence may be inferred from the evidence of other acts, and that
.930 [Vol. 75:3
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requirements indicated the court's shift from Nolan's inclusive parame-
ters for Rule 404(b) to a much more cautious position." In United States
v. Rivera,'9 the court stated that "the use of other crimes evidence is not
looked on favorably and its use must be narrowly circumscribed and
limited."'
The Supreme Court addressed guidelines for the admission of Rule
404(b) evidence in Huddleston v. United States.2 In Huddleston, the pe-
titioner had been charged with possession and the sale of 32,000 stolen
videocassette tapes in interstate commerce.2 Huddleston did not dispute
that the tapes were stolen, but argued that he was unaware of this fact."
The trial court admitted 404(b) evidence of two prior incidents as proof
of Huddleston's knowledge that the tapes were in fact stolen. ' Specifi-
cally, Huddleston sold several new televisions to a retailer for twenty-
eight dollars each, and was arrested on another occasion for attempting to
sell appliances to an undercover FBI agent also at a greatly reduced
price.' Huddleston countered this similar act evidence by contending that
in these instances, as in this case, he had no knowledge that the items
were stolen.'
In generally addressing Rule 404(b) admissions, the Supreme Court
first examined whether a trial court must make a preliminary finding
before submitting k"similar act and other Rule 404(b) evidence to a
jury.""' The Court concluded that evidence under Rule 404(b) should be
admitted if it is sufficient to support a jury's finding that the defendant
committed the similar act.?
The Court expressed concern that unduly prejudicial evidence might
be introduced under Rule 404(b). In response, the Court crafted a barrier
which would prevent the introduction of this type of evidence. Com-
monly referred to as the "Huddleston factor" test, this barrier's founda-
tion rests in four fundamental requirements found in other Federal Rules
of Evidence." Under this test, the evidence must be offered for a proper
the trial court must specifically identify the purpose for the evidence rather than simply invoking or
restating Rule 404(b)); United States v. Biswell, 700 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding
that there must be a clear and logical connection between the uncharged misconduct and the case at
trial).
18. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th Cir. 1989).
19. 837 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1988).
20. Rivera, 837 F.2d at 911.
21. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
22. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 682.
23. Id. at 683.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 684.
27. Id. at 685.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 691.
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purpose' and meet requirements for relevancy." Additionally, the trial
court must make a determination as to whether the probative value of the
similar acts evidence is substantially outweighed by the potential for
unfair prejudice,32 and upon request, shall instruct the jury that the similar
acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it
was admitted."
In United States v. Record,' the Tenth Circuit adopted the Hud-
dleston approach for Rule 404(b) evidence." The court noted that its ear-
lier, inclusive Nolan approach was vindicated both by the Huddleston
decision and the Supreme Court's comment that Congress was more
concerned with avoiding restrictions on Rule 404(b) evidence than with
preventing any possible unfair prejudice arising from its admission.'
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that Huddleston's four-part test for
avoiding potential prejudice greatly clarified Rule 404(b) admissions'
2. Rule 40338
Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence offers two rather broad
positions regarding the relevancy and admissibility of proffered evi-
dence. 9 Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that evidence offered in
any action which would make the existence of a fact of consequence
more or less probable than it would be without that evidence.'° Once
relevancy has been determined, Rule 402 addresses the admissibility of
that evidence.' While all relevant evidence is admissible, this is by no
means an absolute. '2 Admissibility is subject to a variety of potential re-
30. Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
31. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 682; see also FED. R. EviD. 402.
32. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691; see also FED. R. EviD. 403.
33. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691; see also FED. R. EviD. 105.
34. 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989).
35. Record, 873 F.2d at 1374.
36. Id. (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 688-89).
37. Id. at 1374-75.
38. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is titled, "Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time." It states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless pres-
entation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
39. See FED. R. EviD. 401,402.
40. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 is titled, "Definition of 'Relevant Evidence."' It states:
"Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
41. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 is titled, "Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible; Irrele-
vant Evidence Inadmissible." It states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."




strictions, including other Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 Rule 403 operates
as just such a restriction; it recognizes that relevance alone does not
guarantee admission."
Federal Rule of Evidence 403, ' while favoring admissibility,. re-
quires the trial court to employ a "cost/benefit analysis" 7 and evaluate
the probative value of the evidence and the danger of the unfair prejudice
it may create."M By balancing these factors the court ultimately determines
whether the proffered evidence is admissible. 9 While probative evidence
may be defined as that which furnishes, establishes, or contributes to-
ward proof,"0 a definition of prejudice, for the purposes of a Rule 403
balancing test, is more elusive. Almost all evidence is prejudicial to one
party or the other." Under Rule 403, evidence must be more than simply
prejudicial" or unfavorable; 3 it must be "unfairly prejudicial."' Evidence
43. Id.
44. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[1][a].
45. See supra note 38.
46. Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403 Afte" United States v. Old Chief, 20 Am. J. TRIAL
ADvOC. 563, 567 (1997); see also United States v. Guerrero, 667 F.2d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1981)
("Federal Rules and Practices favor the admission of evidence, rather than its exclusion if the prof-
fered evidence has any value at all."); WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[2][c] (discussing a prefer-
ence for the admission of evidence).
47. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[1][a].
48. See FED. R. EVID. 403; see also WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.02[1][a] (discussing that
the court must assess the probative value of a proffered item as well as the harmful consequences
that might flow from its admission).
49. See United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1469 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v.
Cuch, 842 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1988) for the proposition that a trial court "must balance the
evidence's probative value and prejudicial effect under Fed.R.Evid. 403"); WEINSTEIN, supra note 9,
§ 403.02[I][a].
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
51. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.04[1][a].
52. Id.
53. See United States v. Flanagan, 34 F.3d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that "the unfair
prejudice aspect of Rule 403 cannot be equated with testimony which is simply unfavorable to a
party").
54. See FED. R. EviD. 403. Black's Law Dictionary defines unfair prejudice as an "undue
tendency to suggest decision on [an] improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, [an] emo-
tional one" and is caused by evidence "likely to arouse [an] emotional response rather than [a] ra-
tional decision among jurors." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1530 (6th ed. 1990); see also
WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.04[1][b]. However, a more concrete definition of "unfair prejudice"
has remained elusive. One commentator has suggested that courts are preoccupied with the factual
nuances of each "unfair prejudice" case rather than attempts to concretely define the concept through
broader analysis. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 498 (1983). It has been suggested that in-
stead of viewing evidence that evokes emotion as the hallmark of unfair prejudice, triers of fact
should employ both logic and emotion in their judgments. Id. at 503. Under this approach, the detec-
tion of unfair prejudice requires focusing on the end product of the prejudice rather than exclusively
on the process by which the prejudice might be created. Id. The Tenth Circuit, rather than defining
"unfair prejudice," focuses on protecting defendants by examining the purpose and relevancy of
prospective evidence, balancing probative value against the potential for undue prejudice, and con-
sidering if the district court submitted a limiting instruction. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453,
1468-69 (1995).
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may be unfairly prejudicial if it appeals to a jury's sympathy or instinct
to punish," the individual juror's sense of horror or other intense reac-
tions, ' or if it would be misleading and not aid or assist a jury in making
a material determination. 7 This "probative versus prejudicial" balancing
test is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 8
The prosecution may attempt to introduce evidence of an individ-
ual's past criminal convictions." Many defendants have elected to offer a
stipulation to the existence of these prior criminal convictions in an effort
to keep the name and nature of these offenses from the jury.' These
stipulations are frequently rejected by prosecutors,' who argue that they
are not required to accept stipulations and insist on proving each essen-
tial element of the case.' Typically, the defense challenges this rejection,
arguing that evidence of prior criminal acts is unfairly prejudicial. '
In United States v. Brinklow," an appellant was willing to stipulate
at trial to the existence of a prior felony conviction but proposed jury
instructions that omitted any reference to felon status. ' The Tenth Circuit
held that while the government does not have an unequivocal right to
refuse every offer by a defendant to stipulate to facts, the government is
generally not required to accept such an offer and may insist on proving
55. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 403.04[l]c].
56. Id.
57. Flanagan, 34 F.3d at 953.
58. See United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1563 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Jacobs,
supra note 46, at 568 (stating that the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence primarily relied on
the discretion of the trial judges).
59. Frequently, this type of factual situation arises out of a violation of one of several statutory
provisions which prohibit convicted felons from possessing or transporting firearms or explosives.
These cases necessarily require the prosecution to prove felon status. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994); 18
U.S.C. § 1202 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 842(i) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1994); see also United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1471-72 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), a felon in pos-
session of a firearm offense, and the government's attempts to introduce evidence relating to the
nature of prior offenses); Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
of mistake or accident ....
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
60. See Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial Ac-
countability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 947 (1997).
61. See United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 648 (1997); Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1471.
62. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649; Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472.
63. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648; Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472.
64. 560 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir. 1977).
65. Brinklow, 560 F.2d at 1006. Brinldow was charged with "interstate transportation of
explosives by a convicted felon" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 842(i), 844(a). Id. at 1004. Brindow
proposed jury instructions that specified only the essential elements of the offense other than that of
a prior felony conviction and requested the jury be instructed that "there were additional necessary
elements with which they did not need to be concerned." Id. at 1006.
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all of the essential elements of its case.' Additionally, the court held that
the trial court could use discretion in determining whether to compel
acceptance of a stipulation to a prior felony conviction.' The court con-
cluded by stating that the trial court's decision to fully apprize the jury of
the offense charged was not an abuse of discretion.
In United States v. Wacker,' the court addressed the admissibility of
prior crimes evidence when the defendant objected to its admission as
prejudicial and offered to stipulate to the existence of prior crimes. Ap-
pellant Lipp7' was charged with three counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), by being "a felon in possession of a firearm."7 The govern-
ment offered entries from Lipp's journal which detailed his prior felony
convictions as evidence to prove felon status. 3 Lipp objected to the ad-
mission of the journal entries but offered to stipulate to his prior
felonies.' The government refused Lipp's offer to stipulate and the dis-
trict court allowed the admission of his journal."
In cases involving "felon in possession" charges, the existence of a
prior felony conviction is an essential element, but the nature and cir-
cumstances of that conviction are not." The court found that, unlike the
facts in Brinklow," Lipp's proposed stipulation did not attempt to keep
his felony status from the jury, but rather the nature and circumstances of
his prior felony convictions. 8 The court stated that the details of a prior
conviction do not make felony status "more probable or less probable,"
but they do tend to influence the jury's notions regarding the defendant's
character and therefore present a danger of unfair prejudice.' The court
held that the defendant should be permitted to stipulate to the existence
of a prior felony conviction when the present charge involves the "felon
66. Id. at 1006.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 72 F.3d 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
70. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1471.
71. Michael Lipp was one of seven appellants in this appeal. Id. at 1453.
72. Id. at 1471. The three counts of "felon in possession of a firearm" were in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person--
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year;
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting com-
merce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).




77. See supra note 65.
78. See Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472.
79. Id.; see also FED. R. EviD. 401.
80. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
1998]
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in possession" charge of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).' The court determined
that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the journal en-
tries,' but that any error in allowing this evidence was harmless."
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in United States v. Old
Chief' Johnny Lynn Old Chief was charged with three offenses, includ-
ing a violation of the "felon in possession" provision of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1).' Old Chief offered to stipulate to a previous felony conviction
as a way to avoid revealing the name and nature of the previous offense
to the jury.' Additionally, Old Chief proposed a jury instruction that
would have noted his prior felony conviction for use in the jury's consid-
eration of the "felon in possession" charge." The government refused to
accept the stipulation and the district court admitted the evidence relating
to the name and nature of Old Chief's prior conviction.' The Ninth Cir-
cuit addressed Old Chief's offer to stipulate and held that, "under Ninth
Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and thus, it has no place in the FRE
balancing process.""9 In accordance with the earlier holdings of two other
81. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73. In situations where a stipulation to felon status is not accept-
able, a trial court should provide an alternate manner to notify the jury of the existence of the prior
conviction without revealing its nature or circumstances. Id. It was emphasized that the Wacker
holding was limited to cases involving violations of the "felon in possession" provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id. at 1473. The court noted that the D.C. Circuit expressed concern that '"[i]n
cases growing out of narcotics trafficking, the government is free to charge an ex-felon firearms
count together with other counts, thereby permitting the jury to hear otherwise inadmissible evidence
regarding a defendant's prior conviction."' Id. (quoting United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 50
(D.C. Cir. 1992)). The court also recognized that the requirement of proving any felon status under
section 922 represented a significant departure from the more traditional sense of fairness concern-
ing the admission of prior crimes evidence. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
82. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1473.
83. Id. at 1474. The court's harmless error analysis in criminal cases, as with all federal ap-
pellate courts, has its foundation in 28 U.S.C. § 2111 and in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(a). 28 U.S.C. § 2111 states, "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects
which do not effect the substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1997) (emphasis added).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) states that "any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not effect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). Both provi-
sions focus on whether a potential error had a "substantial influence" on the outcome of a proceeding
or "leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect." Wacker, 17 F.3d at 1473 (quoting
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). This standard elevates an appellant's burden
from simply proving the trial court was in error to showing that the error substantially influenced the
proceedings. This standard is particularly high. Additionally, in cases where the trial court errone-
ously admitted evidence of prior criminal acts, the Tenth Circuit has generally held that "where the
evidence against a defendant is overwhelming any error in mentioning a defendant's criminal record
is harmless." Id. at 1474. In Wacker, the court engaged in this "harmless error" analysis and found
that the prejudice to Lipp was slight in comparison to the evidence against him. Id. at 1473-74.
84. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
85. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
86. Id. at 648.
87. Id.
88. Compare United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 648 (1997), with Wacker, 72 F.3d at
1471-72 (refusing to accept defendant's proposed stipulation and admitting evidence).
89. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649.
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circuits, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its earlier recognition of the govern-
ment's right to refuse an offered stipulation and proceed with its own
evidence of prior convictions.'
On review, the Supreme Court noted several other circuits had taken
the opposite position, holding that the district court was obligated to
eliminate the name and nature of the conviction if a defendant offered to
stipulate or admit to a prior conviction." In an effort to address this divi-
sion between the circuits,' the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit.93 It held that evidence relating to the name and nature of prior
offenses generally carries a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant in
cases involving section 922(g)(1) and its "felon in possession" element."
Additionally, the Court held that where allowing evidence of a prior con-
viction may lead to a conviction on improper grounds, the only reason-
able conclusion must be that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the discounted probative value of the record of conviction.
Therefore, it is an abuse of discretion to admit the record when the de-
fendant's stipulation is available.9"
It should be noted, however, that the Court provided several caveats
to the Old Chief decision.' While the Court did not expressly confine the
Old Chief holding to section 922(g)(1) cases,' it was limited to cases
involving proof of felon status.9 Additionally, the Court stated that if
there was a "justification for receiving evidence of the nature of prior
acts on some issue other than status (i.e., to prove 'motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident'), Rule 404(b) guarantees the opportunity to seek its admis-
sion."' The Court concluded by stating that the Old Chief decision "im-
plied no opinion" on whether the district court's error was harmless."°
90. Id. (citing United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cit. 1993); United States
v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir.
1975)).
91. Id. (citing Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73; United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322-25 (D.C.
Cir. 1995); United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1994); and United States v. Poore, 594
F.2d 39, 40-43 (4th Cir. 1979)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 652; see also FED. R. EviD. 403.
95. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
96. See id. at 651-56.
97. Cf. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (noting the analysis in Wacker is limited
to section 922(g)(1) cases).
98. See Old Chief, 177 S. Ct. at 651 n.7.
99. Id. at 655 (citing FED. R. EviD. 404(b)).
100. Id. at 656 n. 11.
1998]
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Stipulations to Prior Offenses: United States v. Wilson. 1
a. Facts
In March 1995, Wichita police officers executed a search warrant on
a residence where a "controlled buy" resulted in the purchase of ap-
proximately one-half gram of crack cocaine."° Wilson was apprehended
during this search after an attempt to evade arrest.'°3 Police found drugs
and drug paraphernalia, money, ammunition, and two SKS assault
rifles.' Wilson had been previously convicted for felony possession of
cocaine."° The government indicted and convicted Wilson on five sepa-
rate counts, including three counts of possession of a firearm or ammu-
nition by a convicted felon.'" On appeal, Wilson contended that the dis-
trict court erred in allowing evidence regarding his prior felony convic-
tion for possession of cocaine.'" At trial, Wilson attempted to stipulate to
the existence of a prior felony conviction as it related to the "felon in
possession" charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)." The district court
allowed the government to introduce the prior felony evidence despite
the offer to stipulate and over Wilson's objection."°
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first considered if it was proper for the district
court to admit prior felony evidence to prove section 922(g)(1) offenses
when Wilson had offered to stipulate."' Relying on earlier cases dealing
with rejected offers to stipulate to felon status,"' the court found that the
district court erred in admitting the prior conviction evidence, despite
Wilson's offer to stipulate, for the purposes of proving the section
922(g)(1) charges."2
The district court, however, permitted the government to offer the
prior conviction evidence for the separate, independent purpose of dem-
onstrating "knowledge" under Rule 404(b). 3 The Tenth Circuit noted
101. 107 F.3d 774(lOth Cir. 1997).
102. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 777; 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 273 (1993) (discussing
informants and controlled buys).
103. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 777.
104. Id. at 777-78.
105. Id. at 777.
106. Id. at 778.






113. Id. at 783-84; see also FED. R. EViD. 404(b).
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that both the Old Chief and Wacker decisions provided for the possibility
of admitting prior conviction evidence under Rule 404(b)."' The defense
objected to the introduction of this evidence."' The court applied the four
part Huddleston test to determine whether the district court abused its
discretion in admitting this evidence under Rule 404(b)."' The court held
that Huddleston's first prong, whether the evidence was recognized as a
valid exception under Rule 404(b), had been satisfied. "7 The court found
the evidence irrelevant and not more probative than unfairly
prejudicial."8 The court concluded that while the trial court abused its
discretion,"9 the error was harmless."
c. Other Circuits
In Redding v. United States,2' the Eighth Circuit addressed the issue
of a rejected offer to stipulate in a section 922(g)(1) proceeding. The
district court refused a defendant's offer to stipulate to the prior convic-
tion element and admitted the full record including the name and nature
of the prior conviction." Relying on both Old Chief' and United States
v. Ballew,2" the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing the stipulation. However, the prejudicial effect was
minimal and the error was harmless given the overwhelming amount of
evidence against Redding and the district court's use of a proper limiting
instruction.' The Eighth Circuit also noted that the Supreme Court re-
frained from ruling in Old Chief as to whether the refusal to allow a
stipulation may be harmless error.'
In United States v. Blake,' the Eighth Circuit again addressed
stipulations to prior convictions in section 922(g)(1) cases.'" Citing Old
Chief, the court found that the trial court abused its discretion in admit-




118. Id. at 785.
119. Id.
120. In making this determination, the court noted that because the error in admitting the prior
conviction evidence "was not of a constitutional dimension," the error would be considered harmless
"unless it had a 'substantial influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it
has such effect." Id. at 785. In the subsequent de novo review of the record, the court found that the
other admitted evidence relating to the controlled buy, and the evidence seized from the house was
overwhelming and therefore any mention of Wilson's criminal record was harmless. Id. at 785-86.
121. 105 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 1997).
122. Redding, 105 F.3d at 1255.
123. United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
124. 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that reversal is required only when an improper
evidentiary ruling affects the substantial rights of a defendant or has had more than a slight influence
on the verdict).
125. Redding, 105 F.3d at 1255.
126. Id.
127. 107 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 1997).
128. Blake, 107 F.3d at 652.
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ting an entire record of prior convictions when the appellant's stipulation
would have had the same evidentiary significance.129 However, before
addressing whether the district court's rejection of the stipulation was
harmless error, the Eighth Circuit examined the sufficiency of the rest of
the evidence against the appellant.'" The court found that the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing an informant's out-of-court statement
for the non-hearsay purpose of identifying the appellant as a metham-
phetamine dealer."' Given the potential for prejudice by both the im-
proper out-of-court statement and the admission of the full record of the
appellant's prior convictions, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded
the matter back for further proceedings.'
In United States v. Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit addressed the
rejection of offers to stipulate to prior convictions in section 922(g)(1)
cases."' At trial, the government rejected defendant's offer to stipulate to
his felon status.3 Over defendant's objections, the district court also ad-
mitted both an unredacted copy of a judgment and commitment from a
previous felony conviction and the testimony from a parole officer stat-
ing that the appellant was a convicted felon." Relying on Old Chief, the
Ninth Circuit held that the admission of this evidence was extremely
prejudicial to the appellant,' 7 and that the district court abused its discre-
tion when it rejected the appellant's attempt to mitigate prejudice.3 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[iun light of the closeness of the case and
the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence ... the government has not
established that the error was harmless."'39
129. Id. at 652-53.
130. Id. at 653.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 109 F.3d 1450 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
134. Hernandez, 109 F.3d at 1451-53.
135. Id. at 1451.
136. Id. at 1451-52.
137. Id. at 1452.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1453. Due to the finding of an abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit examined the
sufficiency of the evidence against Mr. Hernandez. Id. Under both a "fair assurance" or a "more
probable than not" standard, the government failed to show that the district court's error was harm-
less. Id. A lack of fingerprint evidence on the gun in question and poor identification of Hemandez
by the officer involved in the incident may have led a jury to convict Hernandez based on the evi-
dence of his prior conviction for burglary. Id. Additionally, although the jury was given a limiting
instruction that the evidence of the prior conviction should only be considered for the purpose of
establishing that he was a felon, the prior conviction was mentioned during voir dire, the trial itself
and in the court's instructions to the jury. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that, "[t]o tell a jury to ignore
the defendant's prior convictions in determining whether he or she committed the offense being tried
is to ask human beings to act with a measure of dispassion and exactitude well beyond mortal ca-




In Old Chief, the Supreme Court limited its holding only to cases
involving proof of felon status." The Tenth Circuit narrowed this inter-
pretation. It stated that the analysis employed in the Wacker decision was
driven by the unique nature of section 922(g)(1) and therefore was lim-
ited to cases of this kind."" However, it may be possible to extract some
standard for the application of Rule 403 in cases involving offers to
stipulate to prior offenses despite the narrow considerations of Wacker
and Old Chief.
One commentator argues that Old Chief supports four general fac-
tors for use in analyzing whether a court has abused its discretion in re-
fusing to accept stipulations to prior offenses in a Rule 403 setting."2
Those factors include: (1) the prosecution's need for the evidence of
prior convictions; (2) the probative value of that evidence;'" (3) the
potential for harm due to unfair prejudice;'" (4) and the possibility of
mitigating any potential harms.' Due to the similar holdings in Old
Chief and Wacker,"7 these four factors could apply to Tenth Circuit
analyses in similar situations.
Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
harmless error issue in Wacker." Other circuits have employed a
"harmless error" analysis in their post-Old Chief decisions.' This sug-
gests that a fifth factor must be added in order to complete the proposed
analytical framework: (5) the sufficiency of other evidence against the
defendant.'" A "harmless error" analysis must be included in any exami-
140. United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 651 n.7 (1997).
141. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1473 (10th Cir. 1995).
142. See Jacobs, supra note 46, at 568.
143. Id. at 573-77.
144. Id. at 577-82.
145. Id. at 583-85.
146. Id. at 586-89.
147. Compare United States v. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. 644, 647-49 (1997), with United States v.
Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that when a defendant offers to stipulate to
prior felon status, the trial court should permit the stipulation or provide an alternative procedure to
inform the jury).
148. Compare Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656, n.1 1, with Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1473-74 (stating that
the Court implied no opinion on the issue of harmless error).
149. See United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Blake, 107 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1997); Redding v. United States, 105 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir.
1997).
150. This proposed "fifth factor" in addition to the four proposed by Professor Jacobs arises
from the analysis employed by several circuits to determine whether the abuse of discretion in cases
factually similar to Old Chief constituted harmless error. See Jacobs, supra note 46 (proposing four
factors to use in determining abuse of discretion in cases involving the refusal to accept a defen-
dant's offer to stipulate to a prior convictions); see also Hemandez, 109 F.3d at 1453 (finding that
due to the closeness of the case and the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence, the district court's
rejection of a proposed stipulation was not harmless error); Blake, 107 F.3d at 653 (finding that
given the insufficiency of the other evidence against the defendant, the court's rejection of a pro-
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nation of abuse of discretion cases where the district court refused to
accept an offer to stipulate to the existence of prior offenses."'
Following Old Chief and Wacker, an appellant must assert claims of
abuse of discretion in conjunction with claims of insufficient evidence.
Simple findings of an abuse of discretion will fail a "harmless error"
examination when there is overwhelming evidence of a defendant's guilt.
However, while both cases couch their holdings within a section
922(g)(1) factual scenario, it is possible that the Tenth Circuit may rec-
ognize a more general requirement that courts accept stipulations to the
existence of prior offenses in other situations. Should the Tenth Circuit
so hold, an appellant may elect to emphasize the insufficiency of other
evidence rather than the prejudicial effect of admitting a record detailing
the name and nature of prior offenses.
2. Prior Bad Acts: United States v. Shumway'
a. Facts
On June 1, 1995, appellant Shumway was charged with violating
the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and damaging United
States property.'53 These charges stemmed from an unauthorized excava-
tion of two Anasazi archaeological sites." The district court admitted
evidence, after a Rule 404(b) hearing, from a previous case where
Shumway pled guilty to three counts involving the same violations
charged in the instant case.' Initially the government was allowed to
offer this evidence only for the purposes of establishing identity under
Rule 404(b).'" However, upon reconsideration, the district court broad-
ened the scope of its previous ruling and, absent a stipulation from
Shumway that identity was the only issue involved, allowed the evidence
for the additional purposes of proving knowledge and intent."7 The jury
found Shumway guilty on all four counts. "8
b. Decision
Of the issues presented to the Tenth Circuit, the court focused on
whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of Shumway's
posed stipulation was not harmless error); Redding, 105 F.3d at 1255 (finding that given the over-
whelming evidence against the defendant, the district court's rejection of a proposed stipulation was
harmless error).
151. See United States v. Anaya, 117 F.3d 447, 449 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Wilson,
107 F.3d 774, 785 (10th Cir. 1997); Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1474.
152. 112 F.3d 1413 (10th Cir. 1997).
153. Shumway, 112 F.3dat 1417.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1417-18.




prior acts under Rule 404(b).' Relying on the four Huddleston factors,
the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admit-
ting evidence of prior illegal acts under Rule 404(b)."W
As part of the Huddleston analysis, the Tenth Circuit evaluated
whether the probative value was substantially outweighed by the poten-
tial for unfair prejudice under Rule 403"6 Citing to an earlier decision,
the court stated that "'[elvidence of prior bad acts will always be prejudi-
cial, and it is the trial court's job to evaluate whether the guaranteed risk
of prejudice outweighs the legitimate contribution of the evidence.
''
62
The Tenth Circuit found that the trial court, in the Rule 404(b) hearing,
satisfied the third prong of the Huddleston test by finding that the evi-
dence was more probative than unfairly prejudicial.
3. Prior Bad Acts: United States v. Segien'
6 3
a. Facts
Appellant Segien was convicted of assaulting federal officers and
employees in an incident at the Leavenworth, Kansas, United States
Penitentiary.'" A federal officer and a case manager stopped and ques-
tioned Segien" When Segien initially responded to the questioning with
hostile language, however, the situation escalated and violence erupted."
At trial the government introduced evidence of three past incidents of
misconduct. 7 On appeal, Segien claimed that the district court errone-
ously admitted evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)."
b. Decision
Relying on the Huddleston test, the Tenth Circuit considered if the
district court's admission of prior misconduct evidence was an abuse of
discretion.'" The government maintained, and the trial court agreed, that
the three previous acts of misconduct showed Segien's intent and ab-
sence of mistake.' The Tenth Circuit concurred and found that the prior
acts evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b).' Additionally,
the court found that the evidence was relevant, more probative than un-
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1419-22.
161. Id. at 1422.
162. Id. (quoting United States v. Patterson, 20 F.3d 809, 814 (10th Cir. 1994)).
163. 114 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1997).
164. Segien, 114 F.3d at 1016.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1022.
168. Id. at 1017.
169. Id. at 1022-23.
170. Id. at 1023.
171. Id.
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fairly prejudicial under Rule 403, and properly limited to its Rule 404(b)
purpose.' The Tenth Circuit held that the district court satisfied all of the
Huddleston factors and had not abused its discretion.
c. Analysis
Rules 403 and 404(b) are expressly and inextricably connected
through the Huddleston test. The Tenth Circuit, in both the Shumway and
Segien decisions, demonstrated an adherence to the four part Rule 404(b)
analysis and the "more probative than prejudicial" balancing test re-
quired by Rule 403. While the detail in the analysis may vary," the
Shumway and Segien decisions adhere to the same requirements estab-
lished for Rule 403 and 404(b) analysis.
Both cases suggest that the "abuse of discretion" standard is ex-
tremely difficult to overcome, but that it may be even more difficult to
avoid a determination of "harmless error."'"5 Given the broad framework
of the Huddleston decision," coupled with Congress's preference for
admission, " successfully challenging a Rule 404(b) admission is ex-tremely difficult.
The subjective and deferential standard that has come to govern
Rule 403 assessments presents an additional hurdle in a Huddleston
analysis of Rule 404(b) admissions. The Shumway decision illustrates the
difficulties in establishing a case for prejudice. The Tenth Circuit stated
that "we are required to give the trial court substantial deference in Rule
403 rulings.' '7' This deference, coupled with the lack of any concrete
definition for "unfair prejudice"'79 within the circuit, makes a clear as-
sessment of a Rule 404(b) challenge impossible.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Compare United States v. Shumway, 112 F.3d 1413, 1419-22 (10th Cir. 1997) (establish-
ing each element of the four prong Huddleston test in great detail), with Segien, 114 F.3d at 1022-23
(outlining each element of the four prong Huddleston test rather briefly).
175. See Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1419; Segien, 114 F.3d at 1022.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37 (discussing the Tenth Circuit position on Hud-
deston).
177. United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1374 (10th Cir. 1989).
178. Shumway, 112 F.3d at 1422.
179. See supra note 54.
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II. SIMILAR CRIMES EVIDENCE IN CHILD MOLESTATION CASES:
RULES 403 AND 414
A. Background
1. Similar Crimes Evidence in Child Molestation Cases Pre-Rule
414
Rule 404(b) permits admission of "similar crimes" evidence only
for several clearly enumerated purposes, while acting as a general bar
against the admission of character evidence."l Prior to the enactment of
Federal Rule of Evidence 414," ' a "lustful disposition" exception had
been recognized as an extension to Rule 404(b), applying only in sex
crime prosecutions."2
The "lustful disposition" exception was initially recognized at
common law as a result of changing perceptions of women and their le-
gal status.' 3 The "lustful disposition" exception allowed the prosecution
to prove, in its case-in-chief, that the defendant had a propensity to
commit sex crimes through evidence of prior or later instances of sexual
misconduct.'" The prosecution could offer this evidence regardless of
whether the defendant had made an issue of his moral character.' In
addition, the jury was free to infer that evidence of prior sexual miscon-
duct meant that the defendant committed the charged offense.'" Only the
court's own discretion and sense of relevance limited the admission of
this evidence.'"
The federal courts' "depraved sexual instinct theory" paralleled the
"lustful disposition" exception." Policy concerns surrounding child sex-
180. See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
181. Federal Rule of Evidence 414 is titled, "Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation
Cases." It states, in relevant part: "(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is
relevant." FED. R. EVID. 414.
182. See Lisa M. Segal, Note, The Admissibility of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex
Offense Cases: New Federal Rules of Evidence Codify the Lustful Disposition Exception, 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 515, 528-30 (1995); see also Roger C. Park & David P. Bryden, The Twenty-
Second Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Crime Cases:
Reassessing the Rule of Exclusion, 141 MIL. L. REv. 171, 184-86 (1993) (discussing the application
and rejection of the "lustful disposition" or "depraved sexual instinct" exception by some courts).
183. See Thomas J. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evi-
dence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 168 (1993).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 168-69.
186. Id. at 169.
187. Id.
188. See Park & Bryden, supra note 182, at 184; David J. Kaloyanides, Note, The Depraved
Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of the Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1297, 1322 (1992).
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ual abuse'" and the need to circumstantially prove this type of crime" °
formed the basis for this exception. One circuit court permitted evidence
of prior acts of child abuse under the "depraved sexual instinct theory.' 91
While the "depraved sexual instinct theory" exception to Rule 404(b)
existed, however, most federal courts allowed uncharged sexual miscon-
duct evidence under the character evidence exceptions enumerated in
Rule 404(b)."
Federal Rule of Evidence 414 was included as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.1" While the act also
included Rules 413 and 415,"' Rule 414 specifically relates to evidence
of similar crimes of child molestation in criminal proceedings.'95
2. Rule 414
Academic discussion regarding the new Federal Rules of Evidence
began well before Congress formally debated their merits."9 Senator
Biden characterized the proposed rules as violating "every basic tenet of
our legal system."'97 He stated that Congress should postpone any action
until the Judicial Conference completed a study on the possible Rule 404
amendment allowing admission of similar sex crimes evidence. 9 Im-
portant considerations justified the rules, however, including the need to
win convictions in difficult-to-prosecute sex offense cases,'" the proba-
tive value of sexual offense evidence and the need to disprove the de-
fense of consent,' and the need to correct imbalances and establish con-
sistency in judicial decision making.f'
189. Kaloyanides, supra note 188, at 1322.
190. Id. at 1327 ("[1]n child abuse prosecutions, there are usually no eyewitnesses to identify
the source of the injuries. Rather, such prosecutions are commonly built upon circumstantial evi-
dence showing a pattern .... (quoting United States v. Leight, 818 F.2d 1297, 1304 (7th Cir.
1987))).
191. Id. at 1327-29 (recognizing that some courts admit specific acts evidence in child abuse
cases more readily due to the problems in proving this type of case).
192. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78
MINN. L. REV. 529, 541-56 (1994).
193. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796, 2135-37 (1994).
194. Id.
195. See FED. R. EvtD. 414(a).
196. See Bryden & Park, supra note 192, at 566-75; Park & Bryden, supra note 182, at 190-97;
Reed, supra note 183, at 144-45. See generally lmwinkeiried, supra note 5 (discussing the inadequa-
cies of the Judicial Department's arguments in support of the proposed rules).
197. 140 CONG. REC. S10277 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden).
198. Id.
199. See James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 99-101 (1994); Jeffrey
G. Pickett, The Presumption of Innocence Imperiled: The New Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415
and the Use of Other Sexual-Offense Evidence in Washington, 70 WASH. L. REV. 883, 895 (1995).
200. Duane, supra note 199, at 98-99; Pickett, supra note 199, at 895.
201. Duane, supra note 199, at 103-05; Pickett, supra note 199, at 895.
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Following the passage of the new rules, the Judicial Conference was
provided 150 days to submit alternative recommendations regarding
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415.' The Advisory Committee received
and considered public responses to the new rules,23 and submitted a re-
port to the Judicial Conference Committee. The report, adopted unani-
mously, ' stated the following: (1) the concerns expressed by Congress
in enacting these rules were already expressed in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, specifically Rule 404(b);' (2) the new rules are not supported
by empirical evidence, thus diminishing the protections against undue
prejudice;' (3) and because prior bad acts would be admissible that were
not the focus of the charges, a defendant seeking to rebut this evidence
would have to engage in mini-trials within the trial itself.'
The Judicial Conference urged Congress to reconsider the policy
considerations behind Rules 413-415, or in the alternative, adopt
amended versions of Rules 404 and 405 which would specifically ad-
dress evidence of other acts of sexual misconduct. ' Congress did not act
on the Judicial Conference's recommendations within the 150 day period
set forth in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. There-
fore, the new rules became law.
B. United States v. Meacham'
1. Facts
A jury convicted Meacham of one count of transporting a minor in
interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in sexual activity.1 °
The victim was twelve years old when she testified at trial."' The victim
testified to two incidents of sexual abuse by Meacham, one occurring at
age eight and the other, on which the present charge was based, when she
was ten.2 At trial, Meacham denied ever having sexual contact with the
202. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE
ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (1995), reprinted
in 159 F.R.D. 51, 51 (1995).
203. A notice soliciting comment on the new evidence rules was sent to all federal judges,
about 900 evidence law professors, 40 women's rights organizations, and 1,000 other interested
organizations. Id. at 52. Of the responses received, the overwhelming majority opposed the new
rules. Id. See generally Myrna S. Raeder, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Report
to the House of Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995) (resolving that the American Bar
Association opposes the substance of Rules 413-415).
204. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 202, at 52.
205. Id. at 52-53.
206. Id. at 53.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 54.
209. 115 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1997).
210. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1490.
211. Id. at 1491.
212. Id.
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victim.213 On cross-examination, Meacham also denied that he ever fon-
dled his stepdaughters when they were under the age of fourteen."" The
government called two of Meacham' s stepdaughters for rebuttal and both
testified that they were molested more than thirty years ago." '
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit noted some confusion as to whether the step-
daughters' testimony was admissible under either Rule 404(b) or Rule
414. Meacham was indicted on February 23, 1995, and was tried in Sep-
tember of that year."' However, Rule 414 became effective on July 9,
1995. In a case decided after Meacham's trial,21 the Tenth Circuit held
that Rule 413 applied to proceedings commenced on or after July 9,
1997 '1 and that a proceeding commences when the defendant is
charged. 19 Congress amended the effective date of Rule 414, however,
stating that the rule would apply to "'all trials commenced on or after the
effective date of such amendments."' While the congressional action
appeared to overrule the Tenth Circuit's holding that Rule 414 applied to
Meacham, the court analyzed the evidence from both a Rule 414 and a
Rule 404(b) perspective."
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether Rule 403 applied to evidence
proffered under Rule 4 14 .' The court held that prior acts evidence under
Rule 414 must still be relevant and subject to the Rule 403 balancing
test.' The Tenth Circuit found that the district court performed a "more





217. United States v. Roberts, 88 F.3d 872, 878 (10th Cir. 1996).
218. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1491.
219. Roberts, 88 F.3d at 878.
220. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1491 (citing the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-25).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1492-93. The Tenth Circuit initially addressed the question of the staleness of the
stepdaughters' testimony. Id. at 1491-94. The court found that while the language of Rule 414 itself
did not address the issue, the historical notes and the congressional history appeared to indicate that
there was no cutoff point beyond which prior sex offenses are inadmissible. Id. at 1492. The court
cited the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990), in which
that circuit held that evidence of offenses occurring 13 years earlier was admissible. Hadley, 918
F.2d at 851. The Tenth Circuit concluded that "notwithstanding very substantial lapses in time" no
time limit is imposed on the use of uncharged offenses as evidence of other sex crimes. Meacham,
115 F.3d at 1492. See W.A. Harrington, Annotation, Remoteness in Time of Other Offenses Com-
mitted by Accused Affecting Admissibility of Evidence Thereof in Prosecution for Sex Offense, 88
A.L.R.3d 8 (1978).
223. Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1495.
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testimony in a ruling on a motion in limine made before trial,tm and dur-
ing arguments before the bench prior to their testimony. '
The court also determined that the trial court applied a Rule 404(b)
analysis to the evidence. ' Therefore, the court analyzed the decision
from the perspective of Rule 404(b)."7 Applying the Huddleston test, the
court found that: (1) the district court properly identified the purposes of
plan, preparation and intent;m (2) the district court properly weighed the
probative and prejudicial factors under Rule 403 as informed by the leg-
islative history to Rules 413 and 414 and found no unfair prejudice;'
and (3) the district court gave a proper limiting instruction before the
evidence was introduced and at the end of the trial.2' The Tenth Circuit,
satisfied that the Huddleston test was met, found no abuse of discretion
in admitting the evidence under Rule 404(b)."'
C. Other Circuits
In United States v. Larson,232 the Second Circuit addressed the issue
of whether Rule 403 applies to Rule 414 evidence.233 In a situation similar
to Meacham, the Second Circuit evaluated the district court's Rule 403
decision under both Rules 404(b) and 414. ' The Second Circuit held
that a Rule 403 analysis in connection with evidence offered under Rule
414 was consistent with its interpretation of the legislative history for
Rule 414.
In United States v. Sumner,23 the Eighth Circuit also found that a
Rule 403 balancing test applies to evidence admitted pursuant to Rule
414.' The district court denied the government's evidence of "prior bad
acts" on the grounds that the rule was unconstitutional without the appli-
cation of a Rule 403 balancing test.237 Instead, the district court admitted
the evidence under Rule 404(b).238 The Eighth Circuit noted that "[i]t is
224. Id. at 1492 n.2.
225. Id. at 1492-94.





231. Id. at 1495.
232. 112 F.3d 600 (2d Cir. 1997).
233. Larson, 112 F.3d at 604.
234. Compare Meacham, 115 F.3d at 1495, with Larson, 112 F.3d at 604-05 (quoting the
statements of Representative Molinari and Senator Dole regarding the prejudicial and probative
effect of the evidence).-
235. 119 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1997).
236. Sumner, 119 F.3d at 661.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 660. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in admitting the prior
acts evidence under Rule 404(b). Id. at 660-61. The court found that the evidence did nothing more
than demonstrate a propensity to commit crimes and was therefore prohibited under Rule 404(b). Id.
at 661.
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logical that Rule 403 applies to Rule 414... and nothing in the language
of Rule 414 precludes the application of Rule 403.''9 Citing the Second
Circuit's decision in Larson and independently evaluating Rule 414's
legislative history, the Eighth Circuit concluded that it was Congress's
intent to apply Rule 403 to Rule 414.'° However, the court declined to
perform a Rule 403 balancing to determine whether the evidence was
admissible under Rule 414, remanding the matter for a new trial."'
D. Analysis
Meacham is significant for two reasons: (1) the finding that Rule
403 applies to evidence offered under Rule 414; and (2) the finding that
applying Rule 403 to Rule 414 effectively bars constitutional claims
against Rule 414.
Prior to Meacham, as well as Larson and Sumner, there was doubt
as to whether Rule 414 was subject to a Rule 403 balancing test. 2 Rule
404(b) contains the phrase, "may ... be admissible," 3 contemplating a
further assessment to establish what evidence might not be admissible.
Rule 414 contains no such language, however, stating that evidence of
another offense or child molestation "is admissible and may be consid-
ered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant."' This lan-
guage has solicited debate ranging from subtle questioning as to whether
Rule 403 might apply to the new rule,' to contentions that Rule 403
does not apply to Rules 413-415, thereby preventing a fair trial.
Meacham established that prior acts evidence must still be relevant and
followed by a Rule 403 balancing.' While Rule 403 applies, "clearly
under Rule 414 the courts are to 'liberally' admit evidence of prior un-
charged sex offenses."'
Meacham also addressed, in a subtle manner, some commentators'
fears that the new rules will open the floodgates and allow the presenta-
tion of previously inadmissible evidence. In addition to evaluating the
evidence under Rule 414, the court performed a Rule 404(b) assessment
and held that the evidence in question was properly admitted.' This
analysis implies that evidence now offered under Rule 414 was previ-
239. Id. at 662.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 9, § 414.04[2].
243. See FED. R. EviD. 404.
244. See FED. R. EvID. 414(a).
245. See Bryden & Park, supra note 192, at 566.
246. See United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488. 1495 (10th Cir. 1997).
247. Id. at 1492.
248. Id. at 1495.
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ously admissible under Rule 404(b).2'9 Additionally, Sumner suggested
that evidence that fails under a 404(b) assessmentm might fail under a
joint Rule 414/403 assessment."' A recent Tenth Circuit decision, while
addressing Rule 413 evidence, indicates the potential rejection of pro-
pensity evidence under Rule 403 in order to avoid jury confusion."
Several commentators have attacked Rules 413-415 as unconstitu-
tional. 3 The court in Meacham cursorily addressed potential constitu-
tional challenges. It stated that "[u]nder Rule 414 the prior acts evidence
must still be relevant and followed by a Rule 403 balancing. Both condi-
tions were met and, under the circumstances of this case, the prior acts
evidence was not so prejudicial as to violate the defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial."' While this statement, if tested, may have
249. It should be noted that the admission of evidence offered under Rule 413, the counterpart
to Rule 414, is by no means guaranteed. See United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1326, 1332
(10th Cir. 1988).
250. See United States v. Sumner, 119 F.3d 658, 660-61 (8th Cir. 1997).
251. Sumner, 119 F.3dat 662.
252. The court's recent decision in Guardia addressed a Rule 403 rejection of proposed Rule
413 evidence. The court initially found that evidence offered under Rule 413 must meet three
threshold requirements: (1) a trial court must determine that the defendant is accused of sexual
assault; (2) the court must find that the proffered evidence concerns the defendant's commission of a
separate offense of sexual assault; and (3) the evidence must be relevant by showing the defendant
had a particular propensity and that this propensity has a bearing on the charged crime. Guardia, 135
F.3d at 1328-29, 1332. The court then added that the trial court "must make a reasoned, recorded
finding that the prejudicial value of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative
value." Id. at 1332. This final "clear record" requirement was held to be particularly important due to
the sensitive nature of the balancing test performed in these types of cases. Id. at 1331. The court
examined two possible "misapplications" of a Rule 403 balancing test in Rule 413 situations. Id. at
1330. First, a trial court could elect to exclude Rule 413 evidence because of the traditional ban on
character evidence. Id. The court found that while Rule 413 "removes the per se exclusion" on
character evidence, courts should continue to consider the traditional reasons for rejecting character
evidence when performing the "probative versus prejudicial" balancing test. Id. The court also noted
that this type of evidence can have a confusing effect on a case, and trial courts should take this into
consideration. Id. at 1331. Second, a trial court may believe that Rule 413 requires a more restrained
or lenient Rule 403 balancing test. Id. The court stated that while Rule 404(a)(l)-(3) establishes
exceptions to the ban on propensity evidence, trial courts still perform a traditional Rule 403 bal-
ancing test. Id. Similarly, the court held that Rule 413 does not require a more lenient standard to its
exception banning propensity evidence. Id. In the instant case, Guardia was charged with several
counts of sexual abuse based on the complaints of two alleged victims. Id. at 1327. At trial, the
government offered evidence under Rule 413 of four additional individuals alleging a similar man-
ner of abuse. Id. at 1327-28. The trial court rejected this evidence under Rule 403, citing concerns
that the testimony would confuse the issues in the case and mislead the jury. Id. at 1331. The Tenth
Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence. Id. at 1331-32.
Additionally, the court rejected the government's contention that the trial court abused its discretion
when it failed to develop an alternate method of presenting the evidence to minimize the risk of
confusion. Id. at 1332. Distinguishing a previous decision where an abuse of discretion had been
found for this type of failure, the court held that the evidence in the instant case was not susceptible
to an alternate presentation. Id.
253. See James S. Liebman, Proposed Evidence Rules 413 to 415-Some Problems and Rec-
ommendations, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 753, 757-58 (1995); Natali & Stigall, supra note 5, at 23-38;
Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRtM. L. REV.
57, 76-87 (1995).
254. United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1997).
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proven inadequate to withstand constitutional challenge, a recent Tenth
Circuit decision bolsters this position."5
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit remains committed to the general principles of
application for Rules 403 and 404(b) as articulated by the Supreme Court
and by its own precedent. The Tenth Circuit has also taken a lead in ad-
dressing the application of Rule 403 to both Rule 413 and 414 similar
crimes evidence. In light of the court's recent decisions, the potential for
a constitutional challenge to the Meacham decision appears to have
waned. The Tenth Circuit's decisions regarding Rules 413 and 414 will
provide strong precedent for the Tenth Circuit and beyond.
Christopher Dopke
255. United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427 (10th Cir. 1998), while decided after the survey
period, lends direct support to Meacham's constitutional provisions. Compare FED. R. EVID. 413
(applying to sexual assault cases), with FED. R. EvID. 414 (applying to child molestation). Enjady
was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual abuse. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1429. Among the issues
brought on appeal, Enjady contended that the trial court's decision to allow testimony of a prior
sexual assault violated his constitutional right to a fair trial and to due process. Id. at 1430-34. Ap-
pellant argued that the admission of propensity evidence creates the danger of conviction because the
defendant is a "bad person," therefore denying him a fair opportunity to defend against the charges.
Id. at 1430. The court agreed that Rule 413 raises serious constitutional due process issues, indicat-
ing that several commentators have argued its unconstitutionality. Id. However, these arguments are
based on assumptions that Rule 403 does not apply to Rule 413 and that the "is admissible" language
in Rule 413 can be read as bypassing rule 403, requiring all pertinent evidence in all circumstances.
Id. at 1431. Citing the Meacham decision, the court noted its earlier holding that Rule 414 was
subject to a Rule 403 balancing. ld. The court set forth, in great detail, the protections afforded to
defendants through the application of balancing the probative value of the evidence against the risk
of undue prejudice. Id. at 1431-33. The court concluded that, in light of the safeguards of Rule 403,
Rule 413 is not unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 1433. In
considering Enjady's Equal Protection claim, the court utilized a "rational basis" analysis and indi-
cated that a "strong presumption of validity" attaches to the evidentiary classification made in en-
acting Rule 413. Id. at 1433-34. The court found that Congress's objective of enhancing effective
prosecution for sexual assaults is a legitimate governmental interest and Rule 413 is a legitimate
means to that end. Id. at 1434. Therefore, the court held that Enjady's Equal Protection claim was
without merit. Id. As Federal Rule of Evidence 413 is almost identical to Rule 414, the Enjady
decision provides, through analogy, strong support for Meacham's rather superficial constitutional
analysis. As the court cited to Meacham as support for the Enjady decision, expect the roles to be
reversed should a constitutional challenge be made against the validity of Rule 414.
